

# The Conflict Early Warning and Response mechanism (CEWARN)



*in the*

*Inter Governmental Authority On Development (IGAD)*

*Region*


## **CEWARN Baseline Study**

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For the Ethiopian-Side of the Somali Cluster

September 8, 2006

Map: the Ethiopian side of the Somali Cluster



## ACRONYMS

CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict early warning and response unit
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
IAG	Inter Africa Group
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
NRI	National Research Institute
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Project
SNRS	Somali National Regional State

## CEWARN Baseline

**Update Period:**

August 2004 through December 2005

**Area of Reporting:**

Ethiopian Side of the Somali Cluster

**National Research Institute:**

Inter Africa Group (IAG)

**Country Coordinator:**

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September 8, 2006

### Purpose and Scope of the Study

This baseline study is part of CEWARN's activities towards the development of a targeted regional analytical framework for the assessment and analysis of cross-border pastoral conflicts along the borders of IGAD member states. Its primary objective is a better understanding of the multiple factors that in the past have led or continue to influence conflict in the Ethiopian side of the Somali cluster, particularly the Weredas of Moyale, Dollo Ado and Bare which border Somalia and Kenya.

The baseline study is undertaken in the context of commissioning of Inter-Africa Group (IAG) by CEWARN as a National Research Institute (NRI) to assist in the development of an analytical framework to assess, better understand and appreciate conflict and peace dynamics in the IGAD Sub-region, as well as the establishment and implementation of local information networks and production of quarterly early warning and other reports.

The report covers the period August 2004 to December 2005, and provides an overview of peace and conflict dynamics that occurred, as well as the trends in human deaths, violent incident counts, and livestock losses.

As an integral part of the CEWARN mechanism the study has the following objectives: provide baseline information on the profile of the area, identify the various causes and the principal actors of the conflict, suggest response options to enable decision-makers avert or minimise the escalation of conflict in the long, medium, and short-term periods.

This baseline study is thus aimed at providing CEWARN, Ethiopian Government officials, donor agencies, civil societies and other interested parties with the understanding of pastoral conflict and its underlying causes in what is known as the Ethiopian-Side of the Somali Cluster, which comprises the Weredas stated above i.e. Moyale, Dollo Ado, and Bare. The first one is in Borana zone of Oromia Regional State while the latter two are located in Liben and Afder zones of Somali Regional State respectively.

## 1. Historical Background

The pastoral population in Ethiopia is estimated to be 9.8 million or 12-15 percent of the total population. Pastoralists occupy about 60% of the land mass and live in the lowland, peripheral areas of the country. Geographically and historically pastoralists have been far from the centres of power and centralized administration.

The expansion of the central government into the pastoral regions of Somali, Borana and Afar took place at the beginning of the 19-century during the period of the colonial scramble for Africa. After decisively defeating Italy at the battle of Adwa, Menelik entered into agreement with the Italians allowing them to stay North of the Marab River (bordering Eritrea and Tigray). In order to protect the flanks of his fledgling empire from further colonial encroachment Menelik played the British against the French and sent his army into the south and the east as well as the west of Ethiopia to conquer the peripheral and pastoral areas. Subsequently he was able to extend to and incorporate the areas bordering the French Somaliland/Djibouti in the east, British /Mahadist Sudan in the west and in the South as far as Lake Turkana and Moyale. The conquest and absorption of the pastoral lands into the Ethiopian empire was thus completed between 1897 and 1913 during the last years of Menelik. (Bahiru Zewde, 2002; Mohammed Hassen, 2004; Vaughan 2003).

The incorporation of the lowland pastoral areas into the empire had a detrimental effect for the pastoralists and resulted in the arbitrary demarcation of the boundaries. In most of the south and southeast as well as the western parts of Ethiopia the boundaries are straight lines that ran through the ancestral lands of the pastoralists. The result was partitioning of pastoralist territories between the neighbouring states. The demarcation of fixed boundaries curtailed the mobility of pastoral communities.

The problem was compounded by the needs of the modern nation state to create provincial administrative units that further divided pastoralist communal lands. Consequently pastoral life that is based on mobility was seriously impaired by the boundaries of the provinces. Further more the states arbitrarily divided the pastoral grazing areas and attempted to enforce holding and mobility within a circumscribed area. However, pastoralists did not accept this state of affairs and refused to recognize the provincial boundaries and continued to move around in search of grazing and water. As a result the challenge to the state and the opposition to the administrative boundaries became a source of conflict. The low scale conflicts in the pastoral areas of Borana and Guji as well as the Ogaden during the heydays of the empire were typical examples. (Ayele Gebre 2001; Bahiru Zewde 2002).

Politically what was actively pursued in the lowland pastoral areas was a policy of assimilation of the customary leaders into the imperial system. The monarchy recognized or appointed the traditional leaders of the Boran, Guji, Karayou and the Somali clans to work with the representatives of the imperial government. These traditional leaders also shared the resources as well as the tax collected from the people. They paid annual tribute to the monarchy and it was an arrangement of mutual co-existence between the imperial court and the customary leaders. (Mohammed Abdulahi, 2005; Vaughan, 2003).

Although the relation between the monarchy and the traditional chiefs appeared to be smooth on the surface it was basically extractive, based on exploitation of pastoral resources including taxes on livestock and expropriation of land for agricultural activities.

When the imperial government of Haile Selassie collapsed in 1974, a group of army officers calling themselves the Derg took over the reins of power in Ethiopia. The Derg took important and radical political steps that changed the political landscape of the country i.e. nationalization of

rural and urban land and abolition of tenant and feudal relations. These measures were well received by the multitude of the peasants who had suffered under the exploitative rules of the feudal lords. However, these revolutionary actions were not positively perceived by pastoralists and their clan leaders. The nationalization of rural land was considered an encroachment on their important resource and means of livelihood. The violent manner in which the revolution was carried out also created a sense of fear and alienation. The Derg in turn considered the pastoralist leaders part of the feudal system and this resulted in friction and resentment. Relations between the state and pastoralists were marked by mistrust and scepticism. When the military government imprisoned and killed the feudal lords, pastoralist leaders like Ali Mirah of Afar fled to exile in Saudi Arabia while others ran to Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia. The bulk of the pastoralists retreated into the border areas.

In 1977, three years after the Derg came to power; a large-scale war with neighbouring Somali broke out in the Ogaden. The whole Somali region up to the highlands of Harar was engulfed in a devastating war. The Siad Barre regime, whose ambition was to annex the Ogaden had almost, occupied the entire Somali region from Gode to the highlands of Harar. The invasion of Siad Barre forces was repulsed by the Ethiopian army with the help of Russian and Cuban forces in 1979 (Mohammed Abdulahi 2005; Bahru Zewde 2002).

The war had a devastating effect on pastoralists from Ayesha Dewle in the East to Filtu and Moyale in the South. The loss in human lives and livestock was enormous. The traditional safety nets of pastoralists for maintaining social cohesion was shattered by the war.

The military government of the Derg was overthrown in May 1991 by the forces of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that fought a successful guerrilla war. EPRDF's mode of administration, was based on two building blocks i.e Revolutionary Democracy and Ethnic Federalism. The two building blocks find their expression in the form of government that is ethnic federal. The hallmark is the recognition of the many ethnic groups to be represented in institutions of state and government. The Ethiopian Constitution adopted in 1995 states that each ethnic group (nations, nationalities and peoples) has the right to form its own regional government and be part of the Federation of the Ethiopian State. Accordingly the constitution has enabled the establishment of predominantly pastoralist states in Afar and Somali region. Moreover the constitution has stipulated "Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their lands". (Article 40 of the constitution of FDRE). The upholding of these rights is an important step in recognition and promoting the livelihood of pastoralists. In addition the constitution has also recognized that "pastoralists have the right to receive fair prices for their products that would lead to improvement in their conditions of life." (Article 41)

Following the constitutional provisions, the present governance system is based on federal structures while pastoralist societies are deeply traditional and depend on the customary institutions for administration of justice and management of resources. There is thus a dichotomy between the formal party system and the informal customary institutions whose driving force are pastoralist leaders that derive their authority from long established clan traditions. In the Borana region there is the *Gada* system and in Afar and Somali regions there are the clan systems that are deeply hierarchical..

In view of the objective reality on the ground and in light of the governance structures, the nature of pastoral conflicts in the Somali cluster has got a new dimension. Competition over resources has been compounded by disputes over clan territory and demarcation of the new federal administrative units. For example Moyale Wereda has been split between Oromia and Somali Regional States. This has led to serious conflicts between the Borana and the Garre communities. A heightening of ethnic tensions had marked the conflicts and there has been a lack of flexibility in resolving the disputes. The configuration in political alignment of forces following the collapse of the Derg and the rise of EPRDF to power has also led to settling of scores and bloody conflict. For instance the Gabras and the Garres who were in exile in Kenya

during the military regime have returned to Ethiopia and have reclaimed areas that they consider their ancestral land from the Borana. The competition to control trade routes and commercial townships has also precipitated clan conflicts. All of the factors stated above had a spill over effect across clans in Kenya and Somalia and there had been sporadic violent conflicts as well as low-level simmering disputes. (Mohammed Abdulahi, 2002)

## 2. Location and Physical Features

The Ethiopian side of the Somali Cluster is found in the southern most parts of Ethiopia and comprises Moyale wereda in Borana zone of Oromia Regional State and Dollo Ado in Liban zone of the Somali National Regional State (SNRS).

The Somali cluster is one of the most remote areas in Ethiopia and the Weredas are located at a distance of over 800 kilometres from the Federal capital Addis Abeba. The main Ethio-Kenya highway passes through Moyale but the road to Dollo Ado is a gravel road that is difficult to navigate during the rainy season. The two perennial rivers –Genale and Dawa - traverse Liban zone, marking the eastern and western boundaries of Dollo and Filtu weredas. Genale River separates Dollo Wereda from neighboring Afder zone, while the Dawa marks the boundary between Dollo and Moyale Weredas. The border town of Dollo is located at the confluence of the two major rivers.

The rainfall in the area is typically bimodal consisting of the “gu” (March-May), and the “deyer” (September-November) rainfall seasons. The “gu” rains are more important for grazing and water availability than the “deyer”, the later is heavy in the highlands and in most cases results in flash floods. The rainfall amount varies from year to year but on the average it ranges between 400-600 mm per year.

The distribution and amount of rainfall determines the agricultural and pastoral activities including pastoral movements. The dry seasons are “hagar” and “jilal” (May-July), (December-February) respectively. Jilal is the hottest and driest season when pastoralists retreat to dry season grazing areas and water points. The area is thus characterized by arid and semi-arid climates expressed in low water and pasture availability.

Two distinct ecological zones representing different economic activities mark the physical feature of the area. The dominant physical feature is the sparsely populated pastoral rangeland that supports the livelihood of the majority of the population in the region. This includes the rugged and barren land of the Digodia in Dollo and Liben areas and is largely covered with acacia trees, lowland shrubs and scanty grass. The barren land is punctuated by fertile agricultural settlements along the banks of the major rivers, covered in places by palm groves and thick vegetation ( Ayele Gebremairiam,2003).

The physical feature of the area around Moyale is quite a contrast to the rugged terrain around Dollo. Rich grassland and thick vegetation cover characterizes the land. Although the area has been affected by environmental degradation, the vegetation cover is relatively better than in the neighboring weredas.

The dominant mode of livelihood in the cluster is pastoralism where transhumant herders move with their livestock and camels in the semi-arid areas. The pastoralists mainly depend on milk and other livestock products for their living. On the other hand the semi-sedenterized agro-pastoralists inhabit the river valleys where they practice opportunistic cultivation after the receding of the floods at the end of the rainy season. This group also raises livestock for milk and for other livestock products. Along the major riverbanks are found agro-pastoralists that belong to the marginalized groups such as Garimaro (Somali Bantu). Finally there are the urban residents and traders of Dollo Ado, and Moyale.

Dollo Ado town is a vibrant trading route into Kenya and Somalia, with regular trucks and public transport moving along the border. Similarly Moyale is a bustling hub of trade across the border with Kenya.

### 3. Wereda Profile

#### Dolo Ado Wereda

The wereda has 41 Kebeles. Its population size is estimated to be about 138,412 (Dolo Ado Wereda Information Office, 2006). Out of the total 39,301 people live in urban Kebeles and the rest in rural Kebeles. According to a recent study, 50 % of the people are agro-pastoralists, 30% transhumant pastoralists, 15 % urban and 5% sedentary farmers. (Save the Children/USA 2006)

Degodia, belonging to the larger Isaq clan family are the majority in the area. Garimaro (also known as Somali Bantu), are the minority. Degodia are predominantly pastoralists (although there are some who are agro-pastoralists). Garrmiaro are sedentary farmers inhabiting the riverbeds of Dawa and Ganale rivers.

Degodia, Gari and Murule are the neighboring communities inside Kenya while Merehan are the clans on the Somalia side. Within Ethiopia the Ogadeni inhabit the area on the east side and the Garri on the West.

As stated above the livelihood of the Digodia is largely dependent upon pastoralism while the Garrimaro practice agriculture. In addition, Cross-border trade is the other important economic activity in the Wereda. The goods traded include clothes, food items and electronic goods from Kenya and Somali as well as livestock, fuel, chat and vegetables from Ethiopia. Although there is custom office in the Wereda, most of the goods are traded informally.

Provision of social services such as health and education are relatively good in Dolo Ado. The Wereda administration plans and implements its own development activities accordingly to the budget allocated from the region. The World bank funded Pastoral Community Development Project (PCDP) has also been constructing schools and health centers. Despite the encouraging development efforts, lack of manpower has affected the proper design and implementation of these activities.

There are a number of NGOs operating in the area. The main ones are; a) Save the Children-USA, which runs two projects that focus on enhancing livelihood through education, healthcare, natural resource management, famine early warning and provision of livestock market information b) Pastoralist Concern Association of Ethiopia that specializes in cooperative management and local safety net programs. c) Cooperazione Italia that is engaged in provision of irrigation tools, skills and schemes.

In addition to the above, the government and Save the Children-USA are jointly implementing safety net programs for those affected by the recurrent drought. The safety net programs are centered on distribution of food for the able bodied population engaged in public works such as construction of feeder roads.

#### Moyale Wereda

The wereda is divided into 19 Kebeles. The total population of the Wereda is estimated to be 124,071 people. Seventy percent of the people living in the wereda are pastoralist while the remaining are agro-pastoralists, especially those who are living around Tuka kebele. (Moyale wereda information office,2006)

Four ethnic groups live in the area –Boran, Gabra, Burji and Garri. The first three are Oromos while the Garri are Somalis. Demographically, the Borans are the dominant group in the Wereda.

The Borans are largely pastoralists while few of them are agro-pastoralists. Similarly the Gabra and Garri are mainly pastoralists and camel keepers. The Burji are primarily sedentary farmers and some of them are active in trade together with the Gurage (who are found in Moyale town)

The predominant neighboring communities that live across the border in Kenya are the Gabra, Boran and the Garri. Thus, it can be said that these three are the ethnic groups that straddle the Ethio-Kenya border.

Most of the communities living in the Moyale border area are pastoralists. Cross-border trade - both formal and informal (contraband) - is a vibrant economic activity in the wereda. The goods coming from Kenya are mainly cloth, plastic goods, cosmetics, household utensils and electronic goods. On the other hand products out of Ethiopia are cattle, camels, chat, vegetable and fuel.

Wereda sources indicate provision of education and health care services are inadequate as compared to those available in Dolo Ado. There are only 8 health centers/posts .Out of these only three are functional and the rest are not operational due to lack of equipment and manpower. Similarly, it has been reported by the Wereda information office that there are around 21 schools in the Wereda of which 20 are primary schools.

It is too early to talk about the impact of decentralization in the Wereda; there is also no PDCP project being implemented in the area. On the other hand, government safety net programs have started only recently.

In general, there is limited development activity in the area and the problem has been compounded by the outcome of the recently suspended referendum for drawing up the border between Oromia and Somali Regional State. Moreover, the absence of NGO activities in the area has contributed to the slow progress of development activities in the area.

The presence of security forces in the border area has recently been beefed up to counter the OLF “insurgency” and threat of terrorism On the other hand, there is also increased collaboration between Kenyan and Ethiopian security forces and local administrations under the Ethio-Kenya joint border commission to address and enhance issues of common interest including insecurity, trade, and immigration amongst others.

#### **4. Clan Territories, Identities, Rivalries, and Conflicts**

The Digodia are the largest group in Dollo while the Boran are predominant in Moyale. Both clans control the pastoral rangelands inside the cluster and in the neighboring Weredas. The Gabra who are smaller in number also live in Moyale wereda with the Garre pastoralists. On the Kenyan side Somali groups such as the Garre, Gabra and Rendille dominate the border districts of Mandera and Moyale. However these groups claim fluid and sometimes-ambiguous identities. The Garre for example speak Oromifa but have been considered Somali. The flexible and fluid identity helped these different communities to live together and manage their relations and resources in a judicious manner (Mohammed Abdulahi, 2002).

Within the Cluster local groups advance opposing claims for control of dry season grazing areas, water sources and townships. The most intense competition between rival groups of Oromo and Somali is found in Liben zone. It is also a zone where opposing Oromo groups such as the Gujji, and the Borana live. In spite of their rivalry however the Oromo groups maintain unified stand that Liben zone is an Oromo constituency that should be administered under the Borana zone.

On the other hand Somali groups disagree with the claims of the Oromos and strongly consider Liben district their territory. For example they contend that Filtu Wereda in Liben zone is Somali territory. They also believe that the southern part of the Wereda bordering Dollo district is an extension of Digodia land while the northern part stretching from Suftu to Negele town is the traditional territory of the other Somali clans such as the Marehan, the Garre, the Ajuran, and the Karnale. They further state Liben district should be administered under Liben zone with Negele as the capital. (Ahmed Yusuf Farah,1996) In addition to the disputes over the ill-defined border and control of townships, there is a strong rivalry between the Oromos and the Somalis over claims of Moyale town. The dispute over territory and control of townships have led to violent conflict and resulted in loss of human lives as well as raiding of large number of livestock.

The dispute is not limited to Somali and Oromo clans only. There is also disagreement among the Somali groups for control of territory and choice of the Wereda capital. The Garre Somali who are the largest community in Moyale ( Somali) consider the town as their capital while the Digodia who are dominant in Dollo Ado and Filtu insist that the latter has the merits and the advantage of being centrally located to be the administrative center of Liben zone. It should be noted that Negele town was the former administrative center, Moyale a trading township and Filtu a growing rural town (Ibid).

The conflict between the Somali and Oromo groups has not only intensified in the course of the last decade but has developed a new dimension owing to shifts in boundary and territory following the federal structure of government. The intensification of the conflict is not a result of the ethnically based federal structure *per se* but is a consequence of ill-defined borders precipitating intense disagreements.

On the other hand as it was stated earlier pastoral conflicts are not based on ethnic identities alone. Shifting alliances has also been an important factor. Occasionally pastoral groups have formed temporary tactical alliances with rival groups throughout their history in using scarce resources or in repulsing attacks by common adversaries. For example during the Ethio-Somali war in 1977/78 the Garre and the Gabra were thought to have sided with the Siad Barre regime while the Borana supported the Ethiopian forces (Abdulahi, 2005). When Ethiopia won the war the Garre and the Gabras ran to Somali and Kenya fearing reprisals.

After the collapse of the Mengistu regime and during the transition, 1991-92, the Boranas and the Garres were locked in violent conflicts, but no other pastoral groups had aligned themselves on opposing sides based on ethnicity alone. On the contrary the Borana and Digodia had formed a strategic alliance during the same period and they had peaceful coexistence for sometime, while the Boranas were fighting the Merhan on the other side. This indicates that conflicts are not based on ethnic rivalry alone but depend on the type of threats and circumstances surrounding disputes at a particular time. These examples also demonstrate formation and breakup of alliances is a feature of pastoral conflicts and cannot be attributed to a single factor alone.

## **5. The Causes of Conflict in the Somali Cluster**

An understanding of the conflict and its dynamics in the Somali cluster helps to identify the main sources of conflict. Of all the conflict generating factors, the most important ones are pastoral rangeland disputes, environmental stress and politics. Each of these sources of conflict inflames and exacerbates the other and none can be properly understood in isolation from the other. The conflicts are characterized by raiding assaults and banditry incidents. Moreover reprisals and counter reprisals are the dominant features of the conflicts.

The conflicts are also cross border because of clan affiliations and pastoral groups living both in Kenya and Ethiopia. A conflict breaking on one side of the border has a spill over effect on the other side because of kinship ties. Shifting alliances and temporary group formations that characterize pastoral conflicts however sometimes mark these affiliations.

## **Structural causes of conflict**

- **Environmental Stress and the Competition for Scarce resources**

The southern and southeastern parts of Ethiopia that include the Somali Cluster have been continuously affected by recurring drought that has seriously undermined the lives and livelihoods of pastoralists. Major droughts that affected the cluster occurred in 1972-74, 1984-85, 1991-92; 96-97, 2001-02 and more recently in 2005-06. These intense dry spells have in turn led to intense competition for scarce resources that have resulted in clashes between pastoralist communities. The area has also been affected by growth in population and encroachment on pastoral lands. The conflict over grazing and water sources has in turn resulted in large scale loss of human as well as livestock lives. For example the taking over of Borana's land by the Gabra in 1992 has led to animosity between the two groups. Digodia and Garmaro have also been in conflict over the fertile land along the major riverbanks.

- **Local Politics and Control of Territory**

Further to the Proclamation of the Federal constitution in 1995, nine regional states based on linguistic groupings of "nations, nationalities and peoples were established as devolution of power. Moreover the decentralization of administration to Wereda level also contributed to the creation of new entities or administrative units. These in turn have resulted to a shift in boundary that had a detrimental effect for pastoralist who are used to constant mobility looking for pasture and water. For example the former Borana Awraja (equivalent to sub-region) was split into two and fell under the Oromia and Somali regional states. The Digodia and other Somali pastoralists were incorporated under the Somali regional states while the Borana pastoralists fell under the Oromia. Consequently conflict that was characterized by competition for resources had gained a new dimension-competition over boundaries and territories.

For example the recent referendum to draw the border between Oromiya and Somali regional states has become another source of conflict that pitted the Garri communities against the Gabra and Boran. The Garri identify themselves as Somali whereas as the later two consider themselves as Oromo. Although the referendum is now suspended temporarily, tension remains high.

The competition and conflict is fuelled by local politicians to advance their claims over control of administration and resources, which mean acquisition of power and salaried positions. Rival clans not only consider control of territories and townships as a means of ascertaining authority but as a means of gaining exclusive rights to evict or block access to pasture and water for other clans. The recent flare up of conflict between Guji and Boran in May 2006 is a typical example.

## **Proximate causes of conflict**

- **Hardening of Ethnic Identities**

Related to exclusive control of territories there is a corresponding rise in the hardening of identities because of a rise in ethno-nationalist sentiments. Pastoralists who used to have fluid and flexible attitudes towards ethnicity have now adopted serious and hard feelings about their identities. The result has been a proliferation of conflicts and a rise in the level of ethnic mobilization to exclude or evict rival clans from disputed territories

- **Inadequate and Weak Administration and Culture of Impunity**

The devolution of power and administration to the Weredas is a means to "bringing services and government to the people". However the decentralization process has been affected by inadequacies in trained manpower, equipment and facilities. Moreover the thin presence of security forces in the border areas has led to weaknesses in law enforcement and maintenance of peace. Decentralization and the rise of local elites have also weakened the authority of

traditional elders who used to play an important role in settling dispute over access to resources. This in turn has resulted in a culture of impunity where competing pastoralists have taken the law into their hands

- **Proliferation of Small Arms**

The collapse of the Somali state in 1991-92 following the civil war had triggered a major flow of small arms into southern and eastern Ethiopia. The fragmented and scattered armies of Siad Barre's regime and the rebel movements had looted the huge cold war armory and were engaged in arms trafficking into east and southern Ethiopia. The fall of the Mengistu regime at about the same time and the disbanding of the Derg army also exacerbated the small arms flow in the Somali cluster. Moreover international arms traffickers had found their way into stateless Somalia, which had a detrimental effect on security and stability in southern and eastern Ethiopia as well as northern Kenya.

### **Immediate/short term causes of conflict**

- **Raiding as a Coping Mechanism**

As stated above drought spells have over time led to loss of large numbers of livestock, resulting in depletion of herd sizes. One of the means applied to replenish lost livestock is mounting raids on neighbouring pastoral groups. The raids are not limited to the hinterland but are sometimes carried out across borders. In the Somali cluster there have been occasions where the Borana have raided the Garre and the Gabra and vice-versa. On the other hand the Digodia and Borana have also mounted raids and counter-raids on each other in numerous occasions. Raids are also carried out to avenge the loss of livestock or acquire livestock for the payment of dowry.

- **Acts of Crime and Banditry**

Most cases of armed conflict in the border area involve acts of crime and banditry on many occasions resulting into armed communal clashes. For instance, the murder of local politicians or clan chiefs may sometimes trigger reprisals and counter-reprisal killings that spiral into a cycle of inter-clan violence. Reported murders and other crimes also contribute to straining of clan relations and rising tension serving as emotional factors to build up to large armed communal clashes. (Refer to next section for examples)

Clan elders using customary laws that usually entail the payment of blood money usually mediate murder cases. In cases where blood money payment is delayed or clan elders are found deliberately dragging their feet, clashes erupt between rival clans as well.

- **Electoral and Political Violence**


The political violence between October 2004 and February 2005 relating to the proposed referendum to draw the boundaries of Somali and Oromia regional states as well as incidents related to OLF activities were other factor that contributed to the heightening of conflicts.

### Current Situation Baselines

NOTE: The y-axis are dynamically scaled on all of the charts presented below. Therefore, the reader should pay special attention to the upper and lower values presented for each chart. The range of values for all “scores” is from 0 to 100.

**Chart 1** (below) presents the frequency of violent incident counts for the Ethiopian side of the Somali Cluster for the reporting period August 2004 to December 2005.

A total of 34 incidents occurred from August 2004 up to December 2005. Out of these 34 incidents, 19 were Other Crime, 9 Armed Clashes, 3 Protest Demonstrations and 3 Raids<sup>1</sup>.



Violent incidents were high in November 2004 and May 2005. There were no incidents recorded in September 2004, April, August, November and December 2005. Out of the total 34 incidents reported 29 occurred in Moyale wereda, and 5 in Bare. No incidents were reported in Dolo Ado.


Communal incidents over resources and long-standing feuds over past political history (refer to previous section) accounted for 14 of the total 34 incidents recorded during the reporting period. The communities engulfed in these incidents were Garri, Gabra, Borans and Burji in Moyale area and Rahawein and Awlyahan clans in Bare area.

Equally significant were incidents over the referendum to draw the boundaries of Somali and Oromia regional states as well as incidents related to OLF activities. A total of 7 incidents related to the referendum occurred between October 2004 and February 2005. The issue had pitted the pastoral communities against each other in the form of pro-Somalia versus pro-Oromiya supporters. One can argue that the incidents would have continued had the referendum not been suspended in early 2005. Similarly, a total of 8 incidents were related to armed clashes between government troops and OLF supporters or banditry acts by OLF supporters on pastoral communities.

<sup>1</sup> For full description of Violent Incidents see Appendix 1.


From the total of 14 communal conflicts, 6 were of cross-border nature involving communities from Ethiopia and Somalia and most of these were reported to have occurred in Bare Wereda. In addition, some of the communal conflicts that occurred in Moyale area traced their causes to the incidents that had occurred in Kenya in that some of the incidents occurred on the Ethiopian side were retaliatory acts for the deeds that occurred earlier against their cousins in Kenya. This proves the point that since most of the pastoral communities straddle on both sides of the border conflict between communities on one side of the border has a spill over effect on the other side.

Human deaths for the reporting period are presented in **Chart 2** (below);



A total of 15 human deaths were recorded to have occurred during the reporting period. Human deaths were high in August, November and December 2004 as well as in May, 2005. No human deaths were reported to have occurred in the other months. However, there were many incidents that occurred in these months that led to physical injuries. Out of the total 15 human deaths, one was a woman and one a child. Out of the 15 human deaths 6 were as the result of cross border conflicts. Out of the 15 human deaths 4 occurred in Bare Wereda and the rest 9 in Moyale Wereda. No deaths were reported to have occurred in Dollo Ado Wereda. This corresponds with the number of incidents that occurred in each wereda. The large chunk of violent incidents (29) occurred in Moyale Wereda and the rest 5 in Bare Wereda. No incident was reported in Dollo Ado Wereda.


Livestock losses are presented in **Chart 3** (below).



A total of 54 livestock losses were recorded to have occurred during the reporting period. The highest livestock losses occurred in January and February 2005 whereby 31 and 18 cattle were stolen respectively in Moyale Wereda. The livestock losses were as a result of seizure by customs police of cattle intended for illegal sale. The remaining 5 livestock losses were as a result of raids mounted by the Borana on the Gabbra community in June and September 2005 in the same wereda.

The fact that a few numbers of raids were mounted explains why very low number of livestock losses had occurred during the reporting period. Another reason to explain for the low number of raids is the relative peace that was witnessed in Dollo Ado area due to the active engagement of elders, security officials and religious leaders in maintaining law and order. In addition, the relatively less environmental stress in Moyale area due to a comparatively better rainfall also contributed for restraining communities in the areas from engaging in frequent raids to restock their cattle or pay dowry.

Conflict Indicators for the Ethiopian side of the Karamoja Cluster are presented in **Chart 4** (below).



All conflict indicators apart from Environmental Pressures remained constantly high during the reporting period. In analyzing specific conflict indicators, unusual movements of male groups to urban areas in Dollo Ado Wereda in search of job/incomes was one factor that may explain the rise in Provocative Behaviors. Similarly, it also indicates the potential pressure it would bear upon on the livelihoods of people in urban areas as more and more youth flocked to these areas in search of better opportunities. Traditional forecasting/warning was another factor for the rise in Provocative Behaviors. This was particularly important at the earlier period when various conflict predictions/warnings were given by elders/seers in relation to the referendum in Moyale where they warned a possible conflict between pro-Somali and pro-Oromiya supporters and the need to take pre-emptive attacks.<sup>2</sup>


The lesser Environmental Pressure/stress evident in Moyale area may explain why the graph showed a relatively lower value despite the presence of high environmental stress in Dollo Ado and Bare Weredas throughout the period. The latter two areas were severely affected by rain failures. Long dry spells leading to abandonment of grazing lands and watering points as well as concentration of livestock on few areas were dominant features that influenced Environmental Pressures. To make matter worse, when rains occurred in June 2005 the result was floods. The Moyale area began to fill the stress later and the result was the rise in Environmental Pressures after July 2005. The whole area of the cluster later on in late 2005 experienced a severe drought where large numbers of livestock perished.

An increased livestock sale at lower prices as a result of the dry spell was one of the reasons for the increase in Aggravating Behaviors during this period. As a result of long dry season and severe drought in late 2005 the communities were forced to sell their livestock at lower prices to buy grains. This led to depletion of livestock stocks on which the livelihood of the community is dependent upon. This threat to livelihood has influenced the communities to seek alternative means such as raid to restock their livestock which in turn made their neighboring communities a target for possible raid. In addition to this the presence and easy accessibility of small arms made it easier to carry out deadly attacks on perceived antagonists and contributed to the emergence of

<sup>2</sup> There were, however, some non-harmful traditional warnings given during the period

culture of impunity in the cluster and was another factor that aggravated conflict behavior in the areas. In addition it was reported that most of the arms and bullets came into the area from stateless Somalia. Interruption of normal pastoral movements and internal displacements of people as a result of conflict between communities, particularly in Moyale wereda between June to September, 2005, were the other reasons for the aggravation of conflict behavior in the area.

Peace Indicators presented in **Chart 5** (below).



All peace indicators in the area compare to conflict indicators were relatively lower during the period. Alliance formation indicators were particularly low. This is due to the fact that there had been insignificant alliance formation between the communities in the cluster except to some isolated communal ties witnessed in Moyale Wereda in some of the months (February-June, 2005). It is, however, hardly surprising to observe this lack of alliance given the mistrust and tension between the communities living in the area.

Similarly, Exchange Behaviors indicators in the area showed lower value. This is attributed to the fact that the conflict and suspicion in the area hampered exchange of commodities or labor and inter-group marriage. The only visible activities that gave some value to exchange behavior were the cross border trade and labor exchanges witnessed in Dollo Ado wereda. The presence of such behavior in the area is, as indicated earlier, attributed to the prevalence of relatively peaceful situation in the wereda

Peace initiatives in the cluster were also not that plenty. Most of the few peace activities concentrated in Dollo Ado Wereda and were carried out mostly by religious groups. The acceptance and legitimacy the religious institutions enjoy in the area was one of the factors for the success of their endeavors and emergence of peaceful relation in the area. There were, though very few, peace initiatives by security forces and one NGO in Moyale Wereda. Yet, the presence of high tension in the area in the reporting period indicates that it is hard to label them success stories.

Mitigating Behaviors was by far the more pronounced peace indicator during the period. The uninterrupted provisions of social services such as health, education and relief as well as the good performance of local administration in maintenance of law and order were the reasons that somehow mitigate the tension in the two Somali Weredas – i.e., Bare and Dolo Ado. However, the provision of social services and maintenance of law and order were relatively dismal in Moyale area.

## **Comparative Analysis for the reporting period August 2004-2005**

In comparing the August 2004-2005 reporting period with the first section of this baseline analysis that gives the general background of the conflict in the cluster, it can be deduced that most of sources of conflict in the cluster mentioned in the earlier section were evident in the reporting period. Environmental stress and scarcity of resources was witnessed in the area and particularly more amplified around the end of 2005 with the advent of severe drought that affected the whole cluster. Dispute over the referendum associated with the control of territory was the other main source of conflict that resulted in violent conflict and aggravated the simmering tension between the pastoral communities. The flow and availability of illegal small arms through stateless Somali was another conflict aggravating factor that encouraged the culture of impunity as well increased the deadly nature of violent conflicts in the area. Acts of banditry and raids were also evident in the area that ignited reprisal and counter reprisal further increasing the simmering tension and transforming it into violent conflicts from time to time.

### **Analysis of Structural Conflict Aggravating Factors**

The reports from the field had indicated the area of reporting in Moyale, Dollo and Bare to be severely affected by drought. The lack of pasture and water had resulted in unusual movement of livestock in search of grazing lands and competition over meager resources. This in turn had led to development of tension and conflict in the area. Comparatively, however, Moyale was less affected than Dollo Ado and Bare in the beginning but had felt the pressure in the end. Distress sales of livestock because of the drought had also depleted the herd size.

### **Analysis of Proximate Conflict Aggravating Factors**

The conflict between Gabra and Boran on one side and Garre on the other side over the status of Moyale prior and after the referendum was the flash point between these communities. The scrapping of the referendum has led to the reduction of tensions but the simmering antagonistic feelings have resulted in lack of trust and skepticism.

The flow of small arms from stateless Somalia into the Ethiopian side of the Somali cluster has also contributed to the escalation of tension and conflict. Moreover, the drifting of young pastoralists in search of job and incomes has increased the tension in the urban centers of Dollo. Cultural sources such as traditional forecasting by local seers also aggravated the tension in the area by encouraging the locals to participate in the dispute over the referendum.

Apart from this the activity of OLF in the area has added new dimension to the pastoral conflict in the area. Banditry actions of OLF on pastoral communities as well as the government action against the OLF and its sympathizers have fuelled tension in the area and have alienated some of the pastoral communities.

### **Analysis of Proximate Conflict Mitigating Factors**

Peace initiatives aimed at de-escalating the tension between antagonistic communities undertaken by religious and traditional elders in Dollo Ado wereda was one of the notable proximate conflict mitigating factors. There were also some initiatives by government authorities and NGOs in Moyale wereda. These initiatives, however, had limited success in reducing the tension and having an impact. Provision of social services such as education, health and cross-border trade also continued uninterrupted during the period.

**RESPONSE RECOMMENDATIONS**

<b>ACTORS</b>	<b>SHORT TERM</b>	<b>MEDIUM TERM</b>
<b>CEWERU</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Follow up the organization and operationalization of the local CEWERU unit</li> <li>• Provide a means of quick response to mitigate on-going conflicts through steering committee</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform stakeholders through regular reports and updates on the situation in the Areas of reporting to generate immediate and appropriate responses at all levels</li> </ul>
<b>LOCAL COMMUNITIES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apply traditional conflict mitigation mechanisms to reduce conflicts before they escalate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote engagement between customary institutions and local government as well as civil society to incorporate pastoralists voice in local development and peace efforts</li> </ul>
<b>CIVIL SOCIETY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote and strengthen on going peace efforts to continue in a sustainable manner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Help in incorporation of local communities in development as well as peace building effort</li> </ul>
<b>CEWARN</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assist the CEWERU in their organization and operational activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analyze the trends in conflict and peace building in the cluster and provide a perspective to all stakeholders</li> </ul>

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**Appendix 1: Description of Indicators (from the Situation Reports)**

<b>Alliance Formation</b>		
Inter-ethnic group alliance	Ethnic group – government alliance	
<b>Armed Intervention</b>		
Internal armed support	External armed support	
<b>Aggravating Behavior</b>		
Interrupt other activities Development aid problems Media controls Migrant laborers New Markets Negative media coverage	Pastoral migration Harmful migration policy Harmful livestock policy Influx of IDPs Security escorts Small arms availability	Bullets as commodities Protest Student attendance interrupted Separation of groups Livestock prices dropped Post-raid blessing Livestock sales increase
<b>Environmental Pressure</b>		
Natural disaster grazing areas abandoned	Land competition Livestock disease	More livestock in secure areas
<b>Exchange Behavior</b>		
Celebration Inter-group sharing	Inter-group marriage Cross-border trade	Gift offering
<b>Mitigating Behavior</b>		
Access to health care Small arms disclosure Access to education	Relief distributions Markets remain open Positive media coverage	Law enforcement Bride price stable Negotiations taking place
<b>Peace Initiatives</b>		
Women peace messengers Religious peace building	Weapons reduction program NGO peace initiatives	Local peace initiatives
<b>Provocative Behavior</b>		
All-male migration	Pre-raid blessing	Traditional forecasting

**Appendix 2: Definitions of the Incident Categories**

- Armed Clashes
  - *Military Battle* (Armed hostilities or engagements between an official military unit of a government and an armed party. Includes both civil war and inter-state war battles.
  - *Other Armed Clashes* (All other armed hostilities or engagements. Includes all communal and inter-communal battles.
  
- Raids
  - *Raids with Abductions* (Raids focused around abductions of people or the taking of hostages. May include injuries or death to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property).
  - *Organized Raids* (Other organized raids. May include injuries or deaths to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property).
  - *Livestock Theft* (Raids focused around the theft of livestock. May include injuries or death to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property).
  
- Protest Demonstrations
  - *Peaceful Protests* (peaceful protest demonstrations or assemblies. May include isolated or low-level violence).
  - *Violent Turmoil or Riots* (Assemblies or crowds that get out of control. Marked by violence, disorder, damage and/or destruction).
  
- Other Crime
  - *Assaults* (Physical attacks and abuse involving the actual use of physical force against individuals, and/or groups. Does not include abductions.
  - *Banditry* (Commandeering of vehicles, highway robbery, and other similar criminal activities).